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Abstract 
This paper introduces an agency relationship into a dynamic game with informational 
externalities. Two principals bargain with their respective agents about the production cost 
which is the private information of the agents and is correlated between them. We find that 
the agency relationship creates an incentive for simultaneous production, even if this involves 
an inefficient delay. As the commitment power of the principals decreases, this incentive 
becomes stronger. When principals compete, the effect of competition is decomposed into 
two parts. Inter-period competition (from past and future actions) pushes principals towards 
simultaneous actions, while intra-period competition (from concurrent actions) does the 
opposite. 
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1 Introduction
When thinking about launching a new product, a rm's management or headquarters
may not be completely sure about how much it will cost to develop. The R&D divi-
sion usually has a better idea about the development costs. However, it is unlikely
that the division would provide such information for free; typically, it would inate
the costs. The decision of a competitor to introduce a similar product will provide
information that the product is not "too expensive" to develop. Headquarters now
have a better bargaining position vis-a-vis their R&D division. However, the com-
petitor's headquarters, which face the same problem, may also decide to wait for the
information. Natural questions then arise. When is the product launched? Do rms
launch the product simultaneously? What is the eect of the strategic behavior of the
R&D divisions? How does competition aect the equilibrium?
The aim of this paper is to study the eect of the agency relationship in a dynamic
game with informational externalities. Its crucial feature is that the information
which is being released and learned is about strategic agents. These can inuence
what and when the uninformed parties (principals) learn. Agents' incentives are
shaped by both current and expected future rents and, therefore, future information
aects them even before it becomes known.
Learning about the agent from the experience of others but also providing infor-
mation to them is a feature of many real-life situations. Consider a country opening
up to foreign capital. When a foreign rm discusses a joint project (foreign direct
investment) with a local rm, it does not know exactly what the cost will be. If local
rms have similar technologies, the foreign rm can wait and have a better idea of
local rms' characteristics by observing the experience of other foreign rms in this
market. However, a late entry may not be as protable as an early one. Another
example is that of unions bargaining with rms. The rms are privately informed of
their prots, their market prospects, etc. This information is correlated across rms
in the same industry. Then, each union may delay the agreement in order to learn
the outcome of negotiations in other rms. Waiting too long, however, can be costly
as the suppliers and consumers may switch to other rms.
In our model, there are two identical principal-agent pairs, that we call rms, A
and B.1 Each agent produces for his respective principal. The cost of each agent
1The agents can be thought of as independent (exclusive) suppliers in which case we have
"vertical structures".
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is his private information; principals know only the cost distribution. Each agent
produces at most once during the relationship. The costs of the two agents are
perfectly correlated.2 For most of the paper, the principals do not compete, that is,
the value they derive from the agent's production does not depend on the production
(or its absence) of the other rm.
There are two periods, and all participants share a common discount factor.
Inside each rm, the bargaining proceeds a la Sobel and Takahashi (1983). In period
1, each principal oers a price to her agent that she is ready to pay for the product
in that period. If the agent accepts it, production takes place; the principal sells the
good in the market, and the game ends for this rm. If the agent rejects the oer,
the game moves to period 2. The principal then observes whether the other agent
has produced the product or not and makes another oer to her agent that he is free
to accept or reject.
In any equilibrium, there is a cut-o level of cost at which the agent is indierent
between accepting the rst-period oer (and producing in period 1) and rejecting it
(and waiting for a second-period oer). Thus in period 1, by his decision each agent
reveals whether his cost is above or below this cut-o. Then, each principal has an
incentive to delay the production in order to obtain information about the cost of
the other agent and, because they are the same, the cost her own agent. However,
the delay is costly because of discounting.3
The agency problem in our adverse selection environment means that each agent
may pretend to have higher costs than he actually has. Then, he may reject a
protable oer in period 1 if he expects a suciently higher oer in period 2. In
order to see the eect of this strategic behavior, we rst consider the benchmark
setting in which the agents are non-strategic: each of them accepts any oer in
period 1 that is higher than his costs. We then study the full-commitment setting
in which the agents are strategic (they can reject an oer above the costs in period
1), but the principals can commit to two-period contracts. We also look at the no-
commitment setting in which the agents are strategic and the principals can propose
only one-period contracts.
The only feature of the contracting in each rm that is relevant for the other
principal is the information generated in period 1, i.e., the cut-o level of cost. We
2We consider imperfect correlation in Section 5.1.
3Competition between principals that we study in Section 3 may also make the delay costly.
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look for the equilibria in these cut-os. We nd that there are only asymmetric
equilibria (in pure strategies) in the benchmark setting, while there are only sym-
metric equilibria in the full and no-commitment settings. In the benchmark setting,
having the same cut-os implies that the two agents will generate exactly the same
information. Principals prefer then to have dierent cut-os in order to learn more.
When the agents are strategic, in contrast, having the same cut-os becomes useful
as it puts the principals in the best position to limit the strategic behavior of the
agents. If an agent deviates from the equilibrium behavior and rejects a rst-period
oer which is above his cost, the other agent will still accept the same oer and,
therefore, the principal will detect the deviation and will not improve her oer in
period 2.
More generally, we show that the sets of symmetric equilibria are always nested:
the smallest is in the benchmark setting (it may be non-empty once competition is
introduced) and the largest is in the no-commitment setting. In other words, the
agency problem drives the two rms towards symmetric behavior. Moreover, when
the contractual imperfections increase and only one-period contracts are available,
there is more need to discipline the agents and the symmetric behavior becomes even
more likely. The strategic behavior of the agents creates a coordination motive in
principals' actions. Therefore, the internal structure of the rm and, in particular,
the way the agency problem is solved cannot be studied in isolation from other rms
in the market.
Eciency is aected by informational externalities via two eects. The rst
eect is a standard one: the possibility to learn in the future causes the principals
to delay the production, which harms eciency.4 The second eect is strategic and
increases eciency. Since oers in period 2 are made under better information,
they give a lower rent to the agent in period 2 and, therefore, the agent becomes
"softer", i.e., more likely to accept a given oer, in period 1. The second eect
arises, obviously, only when the agents are strategic. In the benchmark setting there
is just the rst eect, so informational externalities decrease eciency. In the full-
commitment setting, the strategic eect is crucial. In the autarky, i.e., when there
is only one principal-agent pair, the principal would commit to a take-it-or-leave-it
oer in period 1 which is very inecient.5 Information obtained from the other rm
4We assume that principals make prots for any cost realization. Thus, any delay is inecient
and is due to rent extraction by the principals.
5This is a standard result in dynamic bargaining models. See, for example, Sobel and Takahashi
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allows the principal to revise her oer and to contract with high cost types in period
2. In the no-commitment setting, the strategic eect becomes less important as
the principals revise their oers anyway and the autarky is relatively ecient. The
standard eect is likely to dominate, as in the benchmark setting.
Competition may take various forms and we allow for a great exibility in the
ways in which it aects principals' prots. We distinguish intra-period competition,
that is, competition from concurrent sales, from inter-period competition, that is,
competition from past sales and future sales. Competition from past sales reects
rst-mover advantage: a second entrant in the market obtains smaller revenues than
the rst one. We nd that inter-period competition pushes the two rms towards
symmetric behavior. For example, in the benchmark setting the competitive pressure
may force the principals to forego the benets of more information and opt to make
the same oers. The eect of intra-period competition is the opposite. Principals
may choose to oer dierent contracts and tolerate some strategic play of the agents
in order to dierentiate themselves and produce in dierent periods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Below we discuss the related lit-
erature. In Section 2 we introduce the model and nd equilibria in the benchmark
and the full-commitment settings assuming no competition. In Section 3 we intro-
duce competition and analyze the eects of the four kinds of competition mentioned
above. We study the no-commitment setting in Section 4. In Section 5 we consider
alternative information structures. The rst structure allows for imperfect correla-
tion between the costs of the two agents, while in the second the costs of an agent
are completely revealed if he produces in period 1, for example, through reverse
engineering by the other principal. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
The two most closely related papers are those of Gu and Kuhn (1998) and Drugov
(2007). Gu and Kuhn (1998) study simultaneous bargaining of several rms with
their unions. However, in order to simplify the model, they assume that the principal
(union) can make an oer only once (but can choose when) and, therefore, the
agent (rm) cannot be strategic.6 This setup roughly corresponds to our benchmark
(1983) and Hart and Tirole (1988).
6In a related paper, Kuhn and Gu (1999) study the same game with the possibility of a strategic
rejection, but impose a sequential order of moves and, therefore, the revelation of information is
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setting. In Drugov (2007) the agent can strategically reject the principal's oer in
an anticipation of a higher rent in the future. The model there is quite dierent
as there are only two types of agent, but the quantity produced is continuous. In
both papers, the only cost of the delay is discounting. In this paper, when principals
compete, the cost of the delay is also a disadvantage of not being the rst in the
market and, therefore, depends on the strategy of other players. In other words,
both the benets of the delay (learning the information revealed by others) and the
costs of the delay (being late in the market) are fully endogenous and may vary in
dierent equilibria.
There is an extensive literature on learning from competitors. It may be about
a technology (see, for example, Reinganum (1989) and De Bondt (1997) for surveys
of patent, or R&D, races) or about the market or demand characteristics as in Rob
(1991), Decamps and Mariotti (2004) and others. The crucial dierence is that, in
this paper, the learning is about the agent who is a strategic player. In models
of the investment-under-uncertainty type as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), better
information in the future always delays the investment since it increases the payo
of investing in the future while the payo of investing today is unchanged. In an
agency model, better future information makes the agent softer both in the future
and in the present, and may lead to more contracting in the present, i.e., a smaller
delay (Drugov (2010), Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010)).
Several recent papers such as Raith (2003), Golan, Parlour, and Rajan (2007)
and Marin and Verdier (2008) study a market equilibrium in which the agency prob-
lem inside rms and market competition interact and inuence each other. We also
make a step in this direction. These papers study models with moral hazard in
which competition aects contracts inside rms through changes in the prots that
the principal obtains from a given agent's action. In our model, the agency problem
is adverse selection, and competition has a dual role of providing information about
the agents' types and changing principal's prots from a given contract. However,
the informational role of competition may be important in the moral hazard envi-
ronment as well. Indeed, starting with Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Holmstrom
(1982) comparing performance of dierent agents is known to provide additional in-
formation, if there are common shocks to agents' performance.7 Then, the dual role
exogenous. The rst bargaining occurs in the autarky, while the second starts with more informa-
tion.
7See also Meyer and Vickers (1997) for a dynamic model.
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of competition seems natural independently of the type of the agency problem.
It is well known that the principal can use correlation among agents' types to
extract rents (see Cremer and McLean (1985) and Shleifer (1985) for early papers).
We obviously use this insight but the present paper diers in two aspects. First, in
our paper there are two "principal-agent" pairs and not a single principal dealing with
two agents. Second, we study a dynamic game which allows us to analyze delay in
contracting.8 Several papers study an adverse selection problem with an exogenous
signal about agent's type. This is precisely the rst step in analyzing our model,
the signal being information revealed by the other rm (taken as given). Fuchs
and Skrzypacz (2010) analyze an innite-horizon bargaining model and show that
the delay is non-monotonic in the likelihood of a signal that reduces informational
asymmetry. In Drugov (2010), in a two-period model, we show a related result
that the delay is non-monotonic in the quality of the signal (as Drugov (2007),
it is a two-type model with continuous quantity). In Strausz (2006) the model is
also dynamic but the agent has unlimited liability which is known to be crucial for
Cremer-McLean mechanisms (together with risk neutrality). Other papers, such as
Riordan and Sappington (1988), Demougin and Garvie (1991), Boyer and Laont
(2003) and Gary-Bobo and Speigel (2006), study a static adverse selection problem
with an exogenous contractible signal.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
There are two principal-agent pairs, that we call rms, A and B, and in each of
them the agent is supposed to produce a certain good. In each rm, the principal
negotiates with her agent about the price she will pay for the production. There
are two periods, and all parties share a common discount factor  < 1. Each agent
produces at most once, either in period 1 or in period 2 or does not produce at all.
The two agents have the same cost  which is uniformly distributed on [0; 1].9;10
They know , but principals know only its distribution.
8Another early paper is Nalebu and Stiglitz (1983) that discusses, mostly informally, the ben-
ets of relative compensation in markets where rms have correlated costs.
9Assuming uniform distribution allows us to obtain closed-form solutions. Qualitative results
do not depend on this assumption.
10We consider imperfect correlation in Section 5.1.
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If an agent produces the good in period 1, the principal sells it in the market and
obtains revenues of v1; producing in period 2 yields revenues v2. In this Section, there
is no competition between principals so the revenues do not depend on the behavior
of the other rm (competition is analyzed in Section 3). Producing in period 1 is
more protable, v1  v2, since the good may be sold for two periods (if it is non-
durable) or it may be used for two periods (if it is a durable good). Also, it is always
ecient to produce, v2  1 . Therefore, if some types do not produce, this is only
for rent-extraction reasons. Finally, we also assume that v1  2 in order to avoid
trivial cases.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of period 1 each principal
proposes a contract to her respective agent. If an agent agrees to produce in period
1, he does so, the principal earns v1 and the game is over for that rm. If the
agent does not produce in period 1, the principal observes whether the other agent
has produced in period 1 (but she does not observe the contract between the other
principal and the agent). Then the principal makes an oer in the beginning of
period 2 which the agent accepts or rejects. Production, transfers and selling of the
good in the market, if any, take place and the game ends.
The agency problem in our adverse selection environment means that the agent
may pretend to have higher costs than he actually has. Then, he may reject a
protable oer in period 1 if he expects a suciently higher oer in period 2. In order
to see the eect of this strategic behavior, we rst consider the benchmark setting in
which the agents are non-strategic: they accept any oer in period 1 that is higher
than their costs. It can also be interpreted as the principals committing to outsource
the production if the oer is rejected. We then study the full-commitment setting in
which the agents are strategic (they can reject an oer above their costs in period
1) and the principals can commit to a two-period contract (possibly conditional on
the production of the other rm in period 1). In Section 4, we also look at the no-
commitment setting in which the agents are strategic and the principals can propose
only one-period contracts.
A strategy of each agent is a triple (p1; p
y
2; p
n
2 ) (all oered in period 1 or not,
depending on the setting), where p1 is the price to be paid to the agent if he produces
in period 1; and py2 and p
n
2 are the prices, conditional on whether the other rm has
produced or not, to be paid for the production in period 2.11 We consider only pure
11The fact that p1 is not conditional on the behaviour of the other pair matters only if the agent
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strategies.12
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We solve the model
in the following way. In period 1, an agent is indierent about producing or not
producing when his type is the cut-o type,  = s. If  < s, the agent strictly
prefers to produce in period 1; while he strictly prefers not to produce if  > s.
The information revealed by each rm after period 1 is a partition, whether the
type is below or above s. Then, s summarizes all the information revealed by each
rm after period 1 and, therefore, only s (which is the probability of production in
period 1) is payo-relevant for the other principal. In an equilibrium, any strategy
(p1; p
y
2; p
n
2 ) maps into a cut-o type s of that rm's agent. The strategies of the two
rms can then be characterized by reaction functions sA
 
sB

and sB
 
sA

and their
intersections are equilibria. Since the two rms are (ex ante) identical, sA
 
sB

and
sB
 
sA

are symmetric about the diagonal.
In each setting, we will rst nd the reaction function sA
 
sB

(that is, we solve
the problem of principal A) and then look for intersections with its inverse. We also
nd prices p1; p
y
2 and p
n
2 oered by principal A to agent A (that we do not mark with
superscript "A" to keep notation simple as this does not create any confusion.)
2.2 The Benchmark
In the benchmark setting, the agents do not behave strategically. Facing an oer p1,
agent A accepts it if it is higher than his costs. Thus, the cut-o type is sA = p1.
After period 1, observing whether rm B has produced or not, principal A learns
if the agent's costs  are higher or lower than sB (remember that the costs are
perfectly correlated). There are two cases to consider depending on whether their
rst-period oer p1 is higher or lower than s
B.
Start with the case sA  sB that we call case a (for above). The information
generated by rm B is useless since, following a rejection of an oer in period 1, the
principal learns that  is higher than sA which is more precise than the fact that 
is higher than sB. Then, principal A acts as if she were in the autarky (i.e., alone in
is strategic and it is justied by additional assumptions that we introduce in Section 2.3 on full
commitment.
12Mixed strategies introduce a signicant complication since the updated beliefs after observing
(no) production by the other pair in period 1 are not truncated uniform. Also, a pure-strategy
equilibrium always exists in our model.
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the market) and solves the following problem13
8>><>>:
max
p1;pn2
BMa = (v1   p1) p1 +  (v2   pn2 ) (pn2   p1)
s.t. sB  p1  pn2  1
(1)
(superscript "BM" refers to the benchmark setting).
When p1 and p
n
2 are oered, with probability p1 = s
A the production takes place
in period 1; in which case the prots are v1   p1; with probability pn2   p1 it takes
place in period 2; in which case the prots are  (v2   pn2 ). If agent A rejects p1,
principal A never observes production in rm B and therefore py2 is irrelevant. The
two prices are obtained from the rst-order conditions of (1) unless the constraints
sB  p1; pn2  1 bind, that is,
p1 = min

max

sB;
v1   v2 + pn2
2

; 1

; (2a)
pn2 = min

v2 + p1
2
; 1

: (2b)
Consider now the case sA  sB which we call case b (for below). In this case the
information generated by rm B is useful since, following a rejection of a rst-period
oer p1 = s
A, principal A learns if the costs of the agent are in the interval (sA; sB]
or (sB; 1]. Principal A maximizes
8>>><>>>:
max
p1;p
y
2 ;p
n
2
BMb = (v1   p1) p1 + 

(v2   py2) (py2   p1) + (v2   pn2 )
 
pn2   sB

s.t. p1  py2  sB  pn2  1:
(3)
From the rst-order conditions and the constraints, the expressions for the three
prices are
13This is the setting of Sobel and Takahashi (1983).
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p1 = min

v1   v2 + py2
2
; sB

; (4a)
py2 = min

v2 + p1
2
; sB

; (4b)
pn2 = min

v2 + s
B
2
; 1

: (4c)
The price oered when there was no production by rm B, pn2 , does not depend
on p1 since the updated beliefs of the principal are that  2 (sB; 1], and therefore do
not depend on p1.
Once the maximal prots BMa and 
BM
b have been found using (2) and (4),
respectively, we can nd when sA is above and below sB and therefore characterize
the optimal contract as a function of sB. This is done in the next Lemma. We only
characterize sA in the text of the Lemma since it is enough to nd equilibria. We
give the complete characterization in the proof in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 In the benchmark setting, there are two cases:
1. If v1+(2 )v2
4   1, there exists BM1 2
 
v1 v2
2  ;
v1 v2+
2

such that
sA =
"
v1 v2+
2
; if sB  BM1
v1 v2+sB
2
; if sB > BM1
2. If v1+(2 )v2
4  < 1, there exists 
BM
2 2

v1 v2
2  ;
v1  2v2
2  
2

such that
sA =
26664
v1  2v2
2  
2
; if sB  BM2
v1 v2+sB
2
; if sB 2
h
BM2 ;
v1+(2 )v2
4 
i
v1  2v2
2  
2
; if sB  v1+(2 )v2
4 
Proof. See Appendix.
An immediate corollary of Lemma 1 is the following.
Corollary 1 In the benchmark setting, sA is never equal to sB.
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The two cases are very similar.14 When sB is small, sA is larger than sB and
constant. We are in case a and the information is not used. At a higher sB = BM1
or sB = BM2 , depending on case 1 or 2, s
A jumps down to v1 v2+s
B
2
< sB (case b)
and continues to be smaller than sB for even higher sB. See Figure 1 for a numerical
example. The most important feature of the optimal sA is that it never equals
sB, as Corollary 1 says. Indeed, whenever sA = sB, it generates exactly the same
partition of the agent's type space and, therefore, the information from the other
rm is useless. The principal then prefers either to decrease sA to be able to use the
information from rm B or to increase sA up to the autarky level. Also note that sA
is the same at sB = 0 and at sB = 1 since there is no information actually revealed
and, therefore, the autarky solution is implemented.
The two rms are identical; thus, the reaction function of rm B is the inverse of
that of rm A. Then, in order to nd equilibria we need to nd intersections of the
reaction curve sA
 
sB

with its inverse, which is done in the next Proposition (the
exact values of equilibrium points are given in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 In the benchmark setting, there are only two equilibria and they are
asymmetric.
Proof. See Appendix.
In an asymmetric equilibrium, by denition, the rst-period production in one
rm, say, rm A, is higher than that in rm B, sA > sB. Then, when  2  sB; sA
only rm A produces in period 1. In other words, with probability sA   sB, rm A
is the "leader" and rm B is the "follower" producing in period 2 with a positive
probability. The strategy of rm B can be described as "wait and see" and it is
more protable than being the "leader" (see prots in Figure 1). Firm A, knowing
that rm B will wait, has to act on its own and use the autarky solution. This
asymmetric equilibrium exists despite the fact that the rms are ex ante identical
and there is a place for both of them in the market.
Let us discuss the eciency of the equilibria. Production is always ecient in
our model since v1  v2  1. For the same total production over two periods, it
is more ecient to produce in period 1 than in period 2 since v1    >  (v2   ).
Second-period prices and, therefore, second-period production are weakly increasing
14The only dierence between the two cases is that the constraint pn2  1 always binds in case 1,
while in case 2 it does not bind when sB < BM2 and s
B > v1+(2 )v24  .
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Figure 1: Prices and prots in the benchmark setting (case 1), v1 = 1:5; v2 = 1:4;
 = 0:5. The long-dashed line is the inverse p1 and its intersections with p1 are
(asymmetric) equilibria. For prots, the scale is adjusted.
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in the rst-period price (production). Then, eciency increases with the rst-period
production, i.e., with s.
In an asymmetric equilibrium, the "leader" has a higher rst-period production
and, thus, is more ecient than the "follower". The behavior of the "leader", as
we noted above, is the same as in the autarky, that is, when each rm acts on its
own. The autarky is then more ecient since both rms would behave as "leaders".
Indeed, informational externalities create an incentive to delay the production which
is inecient, though, privately optimal. This is the only eect in the benchmark
setting.15
2.3 Full commitment
In this Section, the agents are strategic: they agree to produce in period 1 only
if their rents are higher than their expected rent from waiting for period 2. The
principals can commit to two-period contracts.
We make two following assumptions to ensure that, if principals want to use
the information from the other rm, they have to delay the production until period
2.16 First, limited liability of the agents: the rent earned by an agent (payment he
receives minus his true costs) is consumed in the same period and cannot be claimed
back later even if the principal realizes, after observing the other rm, that she has
paid too much. Second, the credit (or cash) constraint of the agent: the principal
has to cover the (claimed) costs of the agent in the period when the production takes
place. That is, the principal cannot order the production and pay for it later when
there will be more information.17 These constraints imply that, at the beginning of
period 1, each principal proposes a rst-period price p1 and a non-negative bonus
to be paid later (conditional on future information). Moreover, only an agent with
costs below p1 can accept this oer, and therefore, s
A  p1. The bonus could be
used to bring sA closer to p1; however, as we will see below, the full commitment
solution involves sA = p1 and the optimal bonus is actually zero. Then, the contract
15In a dierent model, informational externalities could improve second-period production of all
the rms, not only of the "follower". Then, there would be a trade-o between a higher delay of
the "follower" and a better second-period production of the "leader".
16We do so that the full-commitment setting is more comparable to the benchmark setting of
Section 2.2 and the no-commitment setting of Section 4.
17Alternatively, we could replace these two assumptions by assuming that with a small probability
the costs of the two agents are independent and the agent can never incur a loss. See Section 5.1
where we solve such a model (for any probability that the costs are independent).
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oered by each principal at the beginning of period 1 is a triple (p1; p
y
2; p
n
2 ).
Once contracts have been oered (simultaneously and secretly) by the principals,
each agent decides whether to produce in period 1 or not; if he does not, he will
be oered a pre-specied second-period price conditional on the production of the
other rm. As in the benchmark setting, we rst look for the optimal cut-o type
of agent A, sA, taking the cut-o type of agent B, sB, as given. The equilibria are
then obtained by nding intersections of sA
 
sB

with its inverse.
Start with case a where sA  sB. If agent A has costs   sB, he will produce
in period 1. Indeed, he knows that, if he does not produce in period 1, the principal
will learn that his costs are below sB since agent B will produce in period 1 and the
second-period price py2 will satisfy p
y
2  sB  p1. Then, agent A nds it optimal to
produce in period 1.
The agent with costs  > sB has a rent of p1    if he produces in period 1. If
he does not produce, he will be oered a price pn2  p1 since in period 1 the other
agent will not have produced either. His rent will be  (pn2   ). The cut-o type sA
is then
sA =
p1   pn2
1   : (5)
The problem of principal A is
8>><>>:
max
p1;pn2
FCa = (v1   p1) sA +  (v2   pn2 )
 
pn2   sA

s.t. sB  p1  pn2  1 and (5).
(6)
In case b, i.e., sA  sB, by a similar logic, the type which is indierent between
production in period 1 and in period 2 is sA  sB given by
sA =
p1   py2
1   : (7)
Principal A's problem is
15
8>>><>>>:
max
p1;p
y
2 ;p
n
2
FCb = (v1   p1) sA + 

(v2   py2)
 
py2   sA

+ (v2   pn2 )
 
pn2   sB

s.t. p1  py2  sB  pn2  1 and (7).
(8)
The next Lemma simplies further analysis. It says that the principal commits
not to change her oer (unless there is evidence that the rst-period price was unac-
ceptable for the agent). The reason is that the losses that occur because the agent
delays his production outweigh the benets of an additional production in period 2.
This is the same reason as in Sobel and Takahashi (1983) and, more generally, in the
bargaining literature where, for example, the seller, selling to a privately informed
buyer, restricts sales to the rst period.
Lemma 2 In case a, p1 = p
n
2 = s
A. In case b, p1 = p
y
2 = s
A.
Proof. For case a, plug (5) into FCa and dierentiate it with respect to p
n
2 to obtain
sign

@FCa
@pn2

= sign [2p1   2pn2 + v2   v1] :
As v1  v2, the derivative is negative if pn2 > p1. Then, pn2 = p1 and, from (5),
sA = pn2 = p1.
Case b is proved analogously.
Note that in case b the second-period price when no rm produced in period 1,
pn2 , is ex post ecient: p
n
2 = min
n
sB+v2
2
; 1
o
. The principal commits not to change
her oer unless she receives a signal that the rst-period oer was too low.
As the principal commits not to increase the (relevant) price in the future, the
agent accepts any oer above his costs. Then, the rst-period price is also the
agent's type which is indierent about producing in period 1 or 2. The next Lemma
characterizes the optimal sA. Figure 2 shows the optimal sA, prices and prots.
Lemma 3 In the full-commitment setting, there exists FC < v1
2
such that
sA =
2664
v1
2
; if sB  FC ;
sB; if sB 2 FC ; v1
2

;
v1
2
; if sB  v1
2
:
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Proof. See Appendix.
The optimal cut-o sA equals v1
2
; with the exception of the range

FC ; v1
2

where
it equals sB. When sA = v1
2
and is above sB, principal A does not use the information.
To use the information, the production has to be at most sB. Thus, principal A faces
a trade-o: to distort sA downwards and to use information or not to distort sA and
to ignore information. When sB becomes close enough to v1
2
, the distortion of sA
becomes relatively small and the benets of information outweigh the losses due
to the distortion. This happens at sB = FC . The principal keeps the distortion
minimal, that is, sA = sB. In contrast to the benchmark setting, having sA = sB
is useful as it allows principal A to detect the strategic rejection of p1. When s
B
exceeds v1
2
, the principal keeps sA undistorted at v1
2
and still uses the information.
Let us now turn to the equilibria of the game which are characterized in the next
Proposition.
Proposition 2 In the full-commitment setting, there is a continuum of symmetric
equilibria in which both rms have the same production sA = sB 2 FC ; v1
2

. There
are no other equilibria.
All the equilibria are symmetric in the full-commitment setting. This means that
the two rms always produce simultaneously, whether it be in period 1 or in period
2. The two rms generate the same information (the same partition) and principals
use the information from the other rm to discipline their respective agents. In the
benchmark setting, there was no need for this and generating the same information
was useless. Now, by oering identical contracts, principals can detect strategic
rejection of the contract in period 1, that is, rejection when the costs of the agent
 are below p1, since in this case both agents are supposed to accept the contracts
and produce in period 1. Then, principals can contract with their agents in period
2 when no rm produced before oering pn2 > p1 without a strategic response from
the agent in period 1. Indeed, as we see from (7), pn2 does not aect s
A in case b.
These multiple symmetric equilibria can be ranked in terms of their eciency.
As we noted above, a higher rst-period production, that is, a higher cut-o s, cor-
responds to a higher and earlier total production and, therefore, a higher eciency.
Then, the "highest" symmetric equilibrium, in which sA = sB = v1
2
, is the most
ecient one. In the autarky, each rm produces at the same level s = v1
2
in period 1;
however, principals commit to this take-it-or-leave-it oer and there is no production
17
Figure 2: Prices and prots in the full-commitment setting, v1 = 1:5; v2 = 1:4;
 = 0:5. For prots, the scale is adjusted.
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in period 2. Information obtained from the oer allows principals to oer a higher
price pn2 in period 2 without a possibility of strategic rejection of their oer in period
1. This is the strategic eect which increases eciency. In the highest symmetric
equilibrium informational externalities only improve contracting in period 2, as com-
pared to the autarky. In other equilibria, they also cause a higher delay in period
1 which is a standard negative eect. Comparison with the autarky becomes then
ambiguous.
A more ecient equilibrium is always associated with higher prices oered to
the agents which means higher rents for them. The prot-maximizing equilibrium
is, however, an intermediate one as we can see in Figure 2. Then, in equilibria
below the prot-maximizing one the principals, the agents and consumers all want
to move to a higher equilibrium. In equilibria above the prot-maximizing one, the
preferences of the principals are opposed to those of agents and consumers.
3 Competition
In this Section, we introduce competition. We allow for a great generality parametriz-
ing possible eects of competition in the following way. Intra-period competition
arises when the two rms produce in the same period.18 If this happens in period
1, each principal earns 1v1, 1  1, and if in period 2, each principal earns 2v2,
2  1. Inter-period competition arises when the two rms produce in two dierent
periods. Under competition from past sales, a rm suers when it is the second to
produce and in this case its revenues decrease to pv2, p  1. The rst rm then
has a rst-mover advantage. Under competition from future sales, the rm which
rst produces suers from the market's anticipation that the other rm will produce
later. Its revenues then decrease to fv1; f  1.19 We keep our assumption that it
is always ecient to produce, that is, 1v1; 2v2; pv2 and fv1 are all greater than 1.
A stronger competition means that revenues fall more and, therefore, it corresponds
to a lower 1, etc.
20
18A good interpretation is that agents are R&D divisions and the principals are headquarters.
The agents develop a new product that is then produced by principals at zero cost and sold in the
market.
19More precisely, its revenues become a combination of fv1 and v1 weighted by the probability
that the competitor will introduce the product in period 2.
20Note that competition aects the uninformed party. It can also aect the informed party, for
example, when suppliers (with known costs) sell the input to downstream rms with unknown
valuations. The eects of competition would still be similar.
19
There are four possible eects of competition on the optimal cut-o type sA:
competition may increase or decrease sA in case a (when sA is above sB) or in case b
(when sA is below sB). It turns out that there is one-to-one correspondence between
the four kinds of competition described above and these four eects. This is described
in Table 1 below. We say that the set of symmetric equilibria shrinks if the interval
of the values of sB such that sA = sB decreases. In some cases, this interval may
even disappear and then there will be two asymmetric equilibria. When there are
already no symmetric equilibria, the asymmetric ones become more asymmetric in
the sense that the ratio s
A
sB
goes further away from one. We also say that the set of
symmetric equilibria expands to describe the opposite phenomenon.
Table 1: Eects of dierent kinds of competition
Type of competition Setting aected Cut-o type s Set of sym. eq.
Intra-period 1, 1 # both BM and FC decreases in case b shrinks
Intra-period 2, 2 # both BM and FC increases in case a21 shrinks
Past sales, p # only BM increases in case b expands
Future sales, f # only BM decreases in case a expands
Table 1 should be interpreted in the following way. Each line describes the eects
of one of the four kinds of competition. Consider, for example, the rst line which
corresponds to a stronger intra-period competition in period 1, i.e., a lower 1. It
aects both the benchmark and full-commitment settings. It decreases the optimal
cut-o type in case b (and does not aect it in case a). The set of symmetric equilibria
shrinks.
Below, we start with inter-period competition from past sales and study it in
some detail. In particular, we characterize optimal sA in the benchmark setting
and show that symmetric equilibria might appear. We summarize the results for
the three other kinds of competition, providing intuition for their eects. Then,
we provide an example of how a standard model of competition (Hotelling's spatial
model) translates into intra- and inter-period competition.
Finally, we show that, independently of the strength and the form of competition,
symmetric equilibria exist for a larger range of parameters in the full-commitment
21Only in the benchmark setting.
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setting than in the benchmark setting.
3.1 Inter-period competition from past sales
A stronger inter-period competition from past sales, or a bigger rst-mover advan-
tage, corresponds to a lower p. It hurts rm A when rm A produces in period 2
while rm B has produced in period 1, that is, when sA < py2  sB. Then, in case
a, competition from past sales does not have any eect.
Consider case b and let us start with the benchmark setting. Problem (3) should
be replaced by
8>>><>>>:
max
p1;p
y
2 ;p
n
2
BMb = (v1   p1) p1 + 
 
pv2   py2

(py2   p1) + (v2   pn2 )
 
pn2   sB

s.t. p1  py2  sB  pn2  1:
The only dierence with (3) is that, when production takes place after that of the
other rm, the revenues are multiplied by p. As intuition suggests, a stronger com-
petition (lower p) decreases prots (apply envelope theorem). The prices become
(compare with (4))
p1 = min

v1   pv2 + py2
2
; sB

;
py2 = min

pv2 + p1
2
; sB

;
pn2 = min

v2 + s
B
2
; 1

:
We see that p1 = s
A decreases with p and, therefore, a stronger competition
from past sales (lower p) will increase p1. A lower p makes waiting until period 2
less attractive and therefore increases production in period 1.
Lemma 10 in the Appendix characterizes the optimal p1. In particular, compared
to Lemma 1, a new case 0 appears: whenever v1+(2 )v2
2pv2+2   1, s
A = sB in some range.
This obviously gives rise to symmetric equilibria that we did not observe before, in
Section 2. See Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Prices and prots in the benchmark setting (case 0) under inter-period
competition from past sales, v1 = 1:5; v2 = 1:4;  = 0:8; p =
5
7
. For prots, the
scale is adjusted.
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The next Lemma characterizes equilibria in the benchmark setting.
Lemma 4 In the benchmark setting, under inter-period competition from past sales,
there are the following equilibria:
0. If v1+(2 )v2
2pv2+2   1, there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria in which both
rms produce at the same level sA = sB 2
h
v1 v2+
2
;
v1 pv2
2 
i
: There are no
asymmetric equilibria.
1,2. If v1+(2 )v2
2pv2+2  < 1, there are only two equilibria and they are asymmetric.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.
Thus, under competition from past sales, symmetric equilibria appear whenever
v1+(2 )v2
2pv2+2   1. A lower p makes this condition easier to satisfy and it expands the
interval
h
v1 v2+
2
;
v1 pv2
2 
i
, where sA = sB, to the right. In the same spirit, a lower
p makes the asymmetric equilibria of cases 1 and 2 of the benchmark setting less
asymmetric, in the sense that the cut-os in the two rms in period 1 become closer
to each other. Indeed, in these equilibria in one of the rms (say, A) the production
is higher than that of rm B, sA > sB: Then, sA is not aected by p; while s
B
decreases with p. The ratio of the higher cut-o to the smaller one (from Lemma
10 in Appendix, case 1)
sA
sB
= 2
v1   v2 + 
(2 + ) v1   v2
 
2p + 

+ 2
:
increases in p and, therefore, a lower p moves it towards one. The same holds for
case 2.
Consider now the full-commitment setting. There, the principals commit not to
contract with the agent in period 2 (unless the costs are revealed to be higher than
the rst-period price), and so when sA  sB, sA = p1 = py2 (Lemma 2). Therefore, in
the full-commitment setting, inter-period competition from past sales does not have
any eect.
The next Proposition summarizes the main eects of the competition from past
sales.
Proposition 3 A stronger inter-period competition from past sales (lower p) in-
creases the cut-o type s in case b and expands the range of symmetric equilibria to
the right in the benchmark setting. It does not aect the full-commitment setting.
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3.2 Three other kinds of competition
3.2.1 Intra-period competition in period 1
Consider now intra-period competition in period 1. If both rms produce in period 1,
they obtain only 1v1 each, 1  1. A stronger intra-period competition corresponds
to a lower 1. It aects both the benchmark and the full-commitment settings.
In case a, the principals' prots in period 1, instead of (v1   p1) sA, become
(1v1   p1) sB + (v1   p1)
 
sA   sB ; as if she was selling sA units, and the rst sB
of them at the price 1v1 and the other s
A  sB at the price v1. The prots decrease
when 1 becomes smaller; however, the marginal prots are unaected and, therefore,
the optimal prices do not depend on 1.
In case b, in period 1 the principal obtains (1v1   p1) sA and therefore all prices
and the cut-o type sA should be adjusted downwards for v1 becoming eectively
1v1.
Consider the set of symmetric equilibria in the full-commitment setting. The
lower end of the interval where sA = sB is dened as the value of sB, such that the
autarky prots, i.e., when sA > sB, equal prots when sA = sB. From the discussion
above, it is clear that 1 has an identical eect on both prots and, therefore, the
lower end of the interval where sA = sB does not depend on 1. In the benchmark
setting, the lower end of the interval sA = sB is the autarky production that does
not depend on 1.
22 The upper end of the interval where sA = sB is the optimal sA
when the constraint sA  sB stops binding. It decreases since a lower 1 decreases
the optimal sA. In both settings, the set of symmetric equilibria thus shrinks from
the right.
Symmetric equilibria may even cease to exist. Take, for example, the full-
commitment setting. There, the interval where sA = sB becomes
h
FC ; 1v1
2
i
.23
Then, if 1v1
2
is smaller than FC , there are no symmetric equilibria. Instead, two
asymmetric equilibria appear in which in one rm the cut-o s equals v1
2
and in
the other s = 1v1
2
. The same may happen in case 0 of the benchmark setting.24
Whenever symmetric equilibria do not exist, asymmetric equilibria arise with the
22We implicitly assume that there is also competition from past sales (or future sales) under
which symmetric equilibria in the benchmark setting may exist.
23Once 1 is introduced, s
A becomes equal to 1v12 in case b.
24In particular, the condition that separates case 0 from cases 1 and 2 in the benchmark setting
becomes
24
same structure, as in cases 1 and 2 of the benchmark setting.
The next Proposition summarizes the eects of a lower 1.
Proposition 4 A stronger intra-period competition in period 1 (lower 1) decreases
the cut-o type s in case b and shrinks the range of symmetric equilibria from the
right in both the benchmark and the full-commitment settings.
3.2.2 Intra-period competition in period 2
Suppose now that there is intra-period competition in period 2. If both rms produce
in period 2, they obtain only 2v2 each, 2  1. A stronger intra-period competition
corresponds to a lower 2.
The crucial dierence (and complication) of this kind of competition is that the
prots of each rm are now aected not only by the other agent's cut-o type s
(in period 1), but also by his cut-o type in period 2 in the case where nobody
produced in period 1 which is pn2 . In other words, the strategy of each rm is now a
two-dimensional vector (s; pn2 ).
In the benchmark setting, intra-period competition in period 2 hurts prots in
both cases a and b since in each there is some probability that none of the agents
produces in period 1. In case a, exposure to this kind of competition occurs whenever
 2 (sA;min
n
pn;A2 ; p
n;B
2
o
]. Then, the desire to escape from this competition will
make principal A go for more production in period 1, that is, increase sA. This
implies the set of symmetric equilibria shrinks from the left. In case b, exposure to
intra-period competition in period 2 occurs whenever  2 (sB;min
n
pn;A2 ; p
n;B
2
o
]. It
does not depend on sA and, therefore, the optimal sA does not change. This implies
that the upper end of the interval where sA = sB is not aected. Symmetric equilibria
may disappear in the benchmark setting since the interval (v1 v2+
2
; v1 v2
2  ] may not
exist once v2 is decreased to 2v2 at its lower end.
In the full-commitment setting, only case b is aected since in case a there is no
production in period 2. In case b, the prots are not aected at the margin and,
v1 + (2  ) v2
2v1
 (1  1) + 2pv2 + 2  
 1:
(when 1 = 1, we obtain the condition in Lemma 4).
Its left-hand side increases with 1; therefore, a stronger competition (lower 1) makes it more
dicult to satisfy.
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therefore, sA still equals v1
2
unless constrained by sB. Then, FC < v1
2
still exists
since, even at the lowest possible value of 2 =
1
v2
; principal A prefers to distort sA
downwards to sB to be able to use the information if sB is suciently close to v1
2
(from below). Therefore, symmetric equilibria always exist in the full commitment
setting.
The next Proposition summarizes the eects of a stronger intra-period competi-
tion in period 2.
Proposition 5 A stronger intra-period competition in period 2 (lower 2) shrinks
the range of symmetric equilibria from the left in both settings and increases the
cut-o type s in case a of the benchmark setting.25
3.2.3 Inter-period competition from future sales
Finally, the revenues in period 1 may be hurt if the competitor is expected to sell in
period 2. Suppose that rm A earns only fv1; f  1, in period 1 if rm B sells in
period 2.
Under this kind of competition, as well as under intra-period competition in
period 2, the prots of the principals are aected not only by the other agent's cut-
o type s (in period 1) but also by his cut-o type in period 2 in the case where
nobody produced in period 1 which is pn2 . In other words, the strategy of each rm
is a two-dimensional vector (s; pn2 ).
Case b in each setting is not aected as, there, rm A produces only if rm B
does. In case a, when only rm A is to sell in period 1 (that is, when the costs of
the agents are between sB and sA), the market knows that for types of the agent
lower than py;B2 , rm B will sell in period 2. We obtain immediately that the full-
commitment setting is not aected at all since there sA = py2, that is, there is no
production in period 2 by rm B if rm A produces in period 1.
In the benchmark setting, the prots in case a decrease. The eect on marginal
prots, and therefore prices and sA, depends on whether the constraint py;B2  sA
binds. If it binds, py;B2 = s
A, the market knows that the other rm will sell in period
2 and therefore, principal A gets only fv1. Then, when computing s
A, we need to
replace v1 by fv1 in the expressions we had before. If it does not bind, p
y;B
2 =
v2+sB
2
,
25In the full-commitment setting, symmetric equilibria never disappear.
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rm B sells in period 2 if the cost of the agent is between sB and py;B2 ; it does not
sell in period 2 if the cost of the agent is between py;B2 and s
A. Then, assume that
rm A earns a weighted sum of revenues with and without competition from future
sales, that is, v1
sA sB
h
py;B2   sB

f + s
A   py;B2
i
. Future sales still reduce marginal
prots and production in period 1, though to a lesser extent than when py;B2 = s
A.
The next Proposition summarizes the eects of competition from future sales.
Proposition 6 A stronger competition from future sales (lower f) expands the
range of symmetric equilibria to the left and decreases the cut-o type s in case a in
the benchmark setting. It does not aect the full-commitment setting.
3.3 Example: Hotelling's competition
We show here how Hotelling's model of horizontal dierentiation translates into the
intra- and inter-period competition described above. Consider a "linear city" of
length 1 populated by consumers distributed uniformly across the city. Firm A is
located at the left end of the city, while the rm B is located at the right end and
consumers have transportation cost c < 2
3
per unit of length. The (per period)
valuation of each consumer is 1. The product is non-durable and, therefore, if a rm
produces in period 1, it will sell it for two periods.26 Then, if a consumer located at
x buys the product from rm A at price p, his utility is
u = 1  p  xc.
If rm A is alone selling the product in the market and sets its price equal to p,
it sells to consumers located below 1 p
c
. The price that maximizes its prots p1 p
c
is
p = 1
2
and the resulting prots are 1
4c
.27 Then,
v1 =
1
4c
(1 + ) and v2 =
1
4c
.
When the two rms compete oering pA and pB, the consumer located at x
 such
that pA + x
c = pB + (1  x) c is indierent between buying from rm A and rm
26"Production" by the agent can be thought as the development of a new product and once the
product has been developed, the production costs are zero.
27If rms could choose their location, the monopolist would place itself in the middle of the
interval and earn 1  c2 . All the qualitative results would still hold.
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B. Firm A maximizes pAx
 = pA
pB pA+c
2c
taking pB as given. In the equilibrium,
pA = pB = c and each rm earns
c
2
. Then,
1v1 =
c
2
(1 + ) ;
2v2 =
c
2
;
pv2 =
c
2
;
fv1 =
1
4c
+ 
c
2
:
We can now nd 1 and other parameters:
1 = 2 = p = 2c
2 and f =
1 + 2c2
1 + 
> 2c2.
Lower transportation cost c increases prots when the rm is a monopolist, v1
and v2, since more consumers are served. In the competition case, lower c decreases
prots since competition becomes more intense. Both eects lead to stronger intra-
and inter-period competition, that is, lower 1 and other parameters.
We can study the eect of a lower c in two steps. At the rst step consider
1 = 2 = p = f and increase f at the second one. Suppose that v2 is high enough
so all the types produce after two periods, that is, pn2 = 1. The rst step is then
equivalent to a proportional reduction in v1 and v2 and our previous characterization
applies (Propositions 1 and 2). At the second step, inter-period competition from
future sales is relaxed (f increases). The equilibria in the benchmark setting become
then even more asymmetric since the leader increases its rst-period production while
the follower does not change it (Proposition 6). The full-commitment setting is not
aected since the two rms never produce sequentially.
3.4 Comparison of the equilibria in the benchmark and full-
commitment settings
When competition is absent, there are only asymmetric equilibria in the benchmark
setting (Proposition 1) and only symmetric ones in the full-commitment setting
(Proposition 2). Then, trivially, the set of symmetric equilibria in the benchmark
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setting is contained in the set of symmetric equilibria in the full-commitment set-
ting. Under competition, symmetric equilibria may appear in the benchmark setting
(Lemma 4) or disappear in the full-commitment setting (Section 3.2.1). However, as
we show below in Proposition 7, the sets of symmetric equilibria are still nested.
In order to simplify the exposition, we rst prove Lemma 5. In its statement, the
optimal sA is meant.
Lemma 5 (i) If sA = sB in the benchmark setting, then sA = sB in the full-
commitment setting and the prots are the same in the two settings.
(ii) If sA 6= sB (and sA < 1) in either of the two settings, then prots in the
benchmark setting are strictly higher than in the full-commitment setting.
Proof. See Appendix.
The next Proposition presents the main result of this section.
Proposition 7 The set of symmetric equilibria in the benchmark setting is con-
tained in the set of symmetric equilibria in the full-commitment setting. Moreover,
the inclusion is strict unless the set of symmetric equilibria in the full-commitment
setting is empty.
Once Lemma 5 is proven, the proof of Proposition 7 is simple and therefore omit-
ted. Indeed, from Lemma 5(i) it immediately follows that any symmetric equilibrium
in the benchmark setting is also a symmetric equilibrium in the full-commitment set-
ting. The fact that the inclusion is strict follows from Lemma 5(ii). The intuition
is the following. In the full-commitment setting, principals commit not to change
the price in period 2 unless they learn from the other rm that the rst-period oer
was too low. As soon as sA 6= sB, this commitment is costly since types above
sA (in case a) or between sA and sB (in case b) are shut down. In the benchmark
setting, contracting in period 2 is always ex post optimal. Hence, when the agents
are strategic, the principals have an additional motive to set sA = sB.
Another way to state Proposition 7 is that the range of parameters for which there
exists a symmetric (asymmetric) equilibrium expands (shrinks) when the setting is
changed from the benchmark to the full commitment.
29
4 No commitment
In this Section, we analyze the no-commitment setting in which the principals cannot
commit to two-period contracts. To simplify the exposition, we assume away com-
petition as we did in Section 2. We rst derive the best response function sA
 
sB

and then nd the equilibria. After that we prove that the set of symmetric equilibria
is larger in the no-commitment setting than in the full-commitment one. In other
words, symmetric behavior of the two rms is more likely the more severe are the
contractual problems.
At the beginning of period 1 principal A oers a rst-period price p1.
28 If the
agent rejects the oer, she oers py2 or p
n
2 depending on whether the other rm
produced in period 1 or not. These second-period prices are ex post optimal and
higher than p1.
As in the full-commitment setting, the agents are strategic, that is, they accept
the rst-period oer only when it brings a higher rent than the expected rent in
period 2. The cut-o type of the agent which is indierent as to whether he produces
in period 1 or in period 2 is sA given, as in the full commitment setting, by (5) and
(7), respectively, depending on whether sA is higher or lower than sB. Now, however,
second-period prices py2 and p
n
2 are not announced in period 1 but expected to arise
as ex post optimal in period 2.
The game is solved backwards. In period 2, principal A chooses the optimal pn2
and py2 knowing that she faces an agent with costs higher than s
A. In period 1, when
deciding about p1 and, thus, about s
A, she takes into account that p1 will aect
second-period prices. Principal A also takes the behavior of rm B; summarized by
the cut-o type sB, as given.
As in the benchmark and full-commitment settings, there are two cases to con-
sider. Let us start with case a, sA  sB.
If p1 is rejected by agent A, the fact that rm B has not produced either
gives principal A no information as sA  sB. Thus, in period 2 she maximizes
(v2   pn2 )
 
pn2   sA

which gives
pn2 = min

v2 + s
A
2
; 1

: (9)
28Under no commitment, principals cannot commit to future positive payments. The credit
constraint assumed in Section 2.3 can then be relaxed.
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Then, the problem of principal A in period 1 is
8>><>>:
max
p1
NCa = (v1   p1) sA +  (v2   pn2 )
 
pn2   sA

s.t. sB  p1  1; (5) and (9).
(10)
When sA  sB (case b), the principal's problem in period 1 is
8>>><>>>:
max
p1
NCb = (v1   p1) sA + 

(v2   py2)
 
py2   sA

+ (v2   pn2 )
 
pn2   sB

s.t. p1  sB, (7), py2 = min
n
v2+sA
2
; sB
o
and pn2 = min
n
v2+sB
2
; 1
o
:
(11)
The next Lemma characterizes the optimal sA. For a numerical example see
Figure 4.
Lemma 6 In the no-commitment setting, there exist NC1 <
v1
2
, NC2 >
v1
2
andev2 2 v1 v22  3
2

; v1 v2
2(1 )

such that
sA =
26666666664
24 minnv1 v22(1 ) ; 1o ; if 2  v2  ev2
min
n
v1 v2
2  3
2

; 1
o
; if 2  v2 > ev2 if sB  NC1 ;
sB; if sB 2
h
NC1 ;min
n
v1 v2
2(1 ) ; 
NC
2
oi
;
min
n
v1 v2
2(1 ) ; 1
o
; if sB 2
h
v1 v2
2(1 ) ; 
NC
2
i
(when this region exists),
min
n
v1 v2
2  3
2

; 1
o
; if sB  NC2 :
Proof. See Appendix.
The behavior of the optimal response function sA is similar to the full-commitment
case. When sB is small, sA is higher and, therefore, the information coming from
rm B is not used. Then, at sB = NC1 , s
A falls and becomes equal to sB as, in this
way, principal A uses the information but keeps the distortion to a minimum. For
some range of sB, sA is equal to sB. When sB becomes close to one, there are three
possibilities. First, sA may continue to be equal to sB for sB up to one. Second,
sA may become constant, as in the full-commitment setting. Third, sA may become
constant and then fall down again at sB = NC2 to another level. The second jump
at sB = NC2 is unique to the no-commitment setting.
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The second case is illustrated in Figure 4. When sA becomes lower than sB, an
increase in sB causes principal A to oer a higher py2 ; however, s
A stays constant.
That is, principal A suers more and more from the inability to commit not to
increase the second-period price.
Finding equilibria is again straightforward as there are only symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 8 In the no-commitment setting, there is a continuum of symmetric
equilibria in which both principals set the same rst-period price p1 that results in the
same production sA = sB 2
h
NC1 ;min
n
v1 v2
2(1 ) ; 
NC
2
oi
. There are no other equilibria.
As in the full-commitment setting, there are multiple symmetric equilibria and
no asymmetric ones. The two rms always produce together, either in period 1
or in period 2. They generate the same partition of the type space, i.e., the same
information, and the principals use it to commit not to improve their oer, py2 = p1 =
sB. The most ecient equilibrium is the "highest" symmetric equilibrium, that is,
the one in which sA = sB = min
n
v1 v2
2(1 ) ; 
NC
2
o
. The comparison with the autarky is
ambiguous for two reasons. First, unlike the full-commitment setting, the autarky
is relatively ecient since principals cannot shut down high cost types in period 2.
Second, even in the highest equilibrium, rst-period production may be greater or
smaller than in the autarky.29
We now show that the set of symmetric equilibria in the no-commitment setting
is larger than the one in the full-commitment setting. For this, we use Lemma 7
which is similar to Lemma 5 and has a similar proof (omitted).
Lemma 7 (i) If sA = sB in the full-commitment setting, then sA = sB in the no-
commitment setting as well and the prots are the same in the two settings.
(ii) If sA 6= sB (and sA < 1) in either of the two settings, then prots in the
full-commitment setting are strictly higher than in the no-commitment setting.
The proof is based on the fact that FC  NC since the no-commitment solution
is feasible in the full-commitment setting. The equality is reached if and only if all
the prices are the same.
29As in the full-commitment setting, a more ecient equilibrium is always associated with higher
prices oered to the agents which means higher rents for them. The prot-maximizing equilibrium
is, however, an intermediate one as we can see in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Prices and prots in the no-commitment setting, v1 = 1:5; v2 = 1:4;
 = 0:5. For prots, the scale is adjusted.
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Proposition 9 The set of symmetric equilibria in the full-commitment setting is
contained in the set of symmetric equilibria in the no-commitment setting. Moreover,
the inclusion is strict unless the set of symmetric equilibria in the no-commitment
setting is empty.
From Lemma 7(i) it immediately follows that any symmetric equilibrium in the
full-commitment setting is also a symmetric equilibrium in the no-commitment set-
ting. The fact that the inclusion is strict follows from Lemma 7(ii). Intuitively,
in the no-commitment setting, when p1 is smaller than s
B, the principals cannot
commit not to oer py2 > p1. However, if p1 is equal to s
B, it eectively commits
the principals not to increase py2 as then p1 = p
y
2 = s
B. Thus, as compared to the
full-commitment setting, there is an additional incentive for the principals to set
sA = sB.
5 Alternative information structures
In this Section, we consider two alternative information structures. First, we study
the setup where the costs of the agents are independent with some probability, while
still the same with a complementary probability. Second, we assume that, after
production by one rm in period 1, the other can learn the costs exactly through
reverse engineering. For ease of analysis and exposition, we assume, as in Section 2,
that there is no competition.
5.1 Imperfect correlation of costs
Here, we relax the assumption that the costs of the two agents are exactly the
same. Suppose that there are two available technologies and in period 1 neither the
principals nor the agents know if they use the same technology as the other rm.
They only know that it is the same with probability . After period 1 they learn not
only about the production of the other rm but also which technology it uses. Then,
with probability  the costs of the two agents are the same, while with probability
1    they are independent. In the latter case, the production of the other rm
in period 1 does not reveal any information. A higher  is interpreted as more, or
better, information being revealed by each rm in expectation.
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When sA  sB (case a), rm A does not use information it receives from rm B.
Therefore, case a is not aected by .
Consider case b of the benchmark setting. Denote py;c2 and p
n;c
2 the prices, condi-
tional on the production of the other rm in period 1, oered by the the principals
in period 2; when the costs of the two agents turn out to be the same, and pi2 the
price oered by the principals in period 2; when the costs of the two agents are
independent. Problem (3) becomes
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
max
p1;p
y;c
2 ;p
n;c
2 ;p
i
2
BMb = (v1   p1) p1
+
"

 
(v2   py;c2 ) (py;c2   p1) + (v2   pn;c2 )
 
pn;c2   sB

+(1  ) (v2   pi2) (pi2   p1)
#
s.t. p1  py;c2  sB  pn;c2  1; pi2 2 [p1; 1] :
(12)
It is intuitive, and can be easily shown, that p1 = s
A decreases with  since more
information makes waiting more protable.30 This implies that the set of symmetric
equilibria shrinks from the right.
In the full-commitment setting, case b, the cut-o type sA, instead of (7), becomes
sA =
p1    [py;c2 + (1  ) pi2]
1   : (13)
When  = 1, principal A commits not to increase the price in period 2 (Lemma
2). For  < 1, she has even fewer reasons to contract in period 2 and Lemma 2
extends to this case as well. That is, p1 = p
y;c
2 = p
i
2 = s
A and we obtain the same
solution as the one characterized in Lemma 3. Then, when p1 = s
B, prots increase
with  since a higher  increases the chances that the costs of the agent are known
to be higher than sB; in which case some production takes place in period 2. In case
a the prots are unaected by  and, therefore, FC increases with a lower . When
 = 0 , no information is ever revealed by the other rm and p1 =
v1
2
for any sB, i.e.,
FC = v1
2
. This is the autarky solution.
In the no-commitment setting, the cut-o type sA is also given by (13). Since
there is no commitment to two-period contracts, at least pi2 will be higher than
p1 and, thus, s
A will be lower than p1. There is now a strategic eect of more
30If pi2 = p
y;c
2 =
v2+p1
2 < s
B , then p1 does not change with . Indeed, (12) becomes (3) that does
not depend on .
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information:
@sA
@
=

1  
 
pi2   py;c2

> 0.
This is the precise sense in which the agent becomes softer in bargaining in
period 1 when more information is anticipated in the future. This eect calls for
more production in period 1. The strategic eect is opposite to the direct eect
that we observed in the benchmark setting where more information leads to more
production after this information becomes available. It turns out that, in our model,
the strategic eect is always the (weakly) dominating one. This result is the next
Lemma.
Lemma 8 In the no-commitment setting, more information increases production in
period 1, @s
@
 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
This implies that the set of symmetric equilibria expands to the right.
We summarize the main eects of more information in the next Proposition.
Proposition 10 More information (higher )
(i) decreases the cut-o type s in case b and shrinks the set of symmetric equilibria
from the right in the benchmark setting;
(ii) expands the set of symmetric equilibria to the left in the full-commitment set-
ting;
(iii) increases the cut-o type s in case b and expands the set of symmetric equilibria
to the right in the no-commitment setting.
The eects of higher  are opposite whether the agent is strategic or not. A higher
 makes information obtained from the other rm more valuable. In the benchmark
setting, this increases incentives of the principals to delay the production and to use
information from the other rm. When the agent is strategic, this information can
also be used for more ecient contracting in period 1, that is, even before it becomes
available (strategic eect). In the no-commitment setting, this eects dominates. In
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the full-commitment setting, the take-it-or-leave-it oer made in period 1 does not
depend on . However, whenever sA  sB, a higher  increases the chances that the
principal A will learn that the rst{period oer was too low and will make a better
oer in period 2. Then, while sA is not aected by  in both cases a and b, prots
in case b increase with  and, therefore, the set of symmetric equilibria expands to
the left (FC falls).
5.2 Perfect learning
So far we have considered "contractual" learning, that is, the inference about the
agents' costs made after in period 1 was based solely on the equilibrium contracts.
Often, however, competitors may learn the production costs of a product doing
reverse engineering. Then, each principal learns the exact cost of her agent if the
other rm has produced in period 1. This is why we call it perfect learning. After
no production in period 1, as before, the principal learns only that the agent's cost
is above a certain cut-o. As in Section 2, consider the setup without competition.
Case a does not change under perfect learning since, here, rm A does not use
the information revealed by rm B.
Consider case b. If agent A does not accept producing at price p1, principal A
will learn his type and, therefore, will oer py2 =  in period 2. The agent will not
get any rent and, thus, accepts any rst-period price above his cost. That is, the
cut-o type sA equals p1 in all three settings. Even when strategic, the agent behaves
"myopically" and the commitment ability of the principal no longer matters.
The problem of principal A is now
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
max
sA;pn2
b =
 
v1   sA

sA + 
sBZ
sA
(v2   ) d +  (v2   pn2 )
 
pn2   sB

s.t. sA  sB  pn2  1:
Solving it, we obtain
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sA = min

v1   v2
2   ; s
B

; (14a)
pn2 = min

v2 + s
B
2
; 1

: (14b)
Since in case a perfect learning does not matter, our previous analysis applies for
sB  v1 v2
2  , in particular, the characterization of the cut-o type s
A in Lemmas 1, 3
and 6. For sB > v1 v2
2  , the three settings become identical and the same s
A = p1 =
v1 v2
2  is optimal in case b. This implies that
v1 v2
2  becomes the upper end of the
interval where sA = sB. Since v1 v2
2  <
v1
2
, the sets of symmetric equilibria shrink
in the full-commitment and no-commitment settings. In the benchmark setting,
symmetric equilibria exist only if inter-period competition is present. For example,
under inter-period competition from past sales, (14a) becomes
sA = min

v1   v2
2   ; s
B

and sA = sB if sB 2 v1 v2+
2
; v1 v2
2 

, which is the same interval as before (Lemma
4, case 0). Therefore, perfect learning does not aect the set of symmetric equilib-
ria.31;32
The next Proposition summarizes the main eects of perfect learning.
Proposition 11 Introduction of perfect learning shrinks the sets of symmetric equi-
libria from the right in the full-commitment and no-commitment settings.
Under perfect learning, the sets of symmetric equilibria still increase with the
severity of the agency problem as before (see Proposition 7). However, this result is
now driven by case a where information is not used. In case b, the agency problem
is the same across the three settings, and the sets of symmetric equilibria have the
same upper endpoint.
31This is because at sB = v1 v22  , when it becomes optimal to have s
A < sB , the eect of perfect
learning in terms of higher prots is still of the second order.
32In cases 1 and 2 of the benchmark setting, perfect learning decreases BM1 and 
BM
2 , respectively,
since prots are higher under perfect learning in case b while remaining unchanged in case a.
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6 Conclusion
This paper investigated informational externalities across intra-rm bargaining games
in a market setting. We found that the agency relationship creates a coordination
motive in principals' actions making simultaneous production more likely. Each prin-
cipal uses the information generated by the competitor to discipline her agent. This
is done the best when the agents are put in the same conditions, that is, when they
face the same incentives to produce. When the agency problem becomes more severe,
there are more benets in limiting the strategic behavior of the agents and the two
rms tend to behave symmetrically even more. The eects of competition are very
dierent depending whether it is intra- or inter-period. Inter-period competition
penalizes rms when they produce in dierent periods and, therefore, it is conducive
for the simultaneous production. Intra-period competition has an opposite eect
since it pushes rms to dierentiate and to produce in dierent periods.
This paper makes a step towards understanding the interactions between internal
structure of rms and competition in an industry equilibrium. Competition plays
a dual role since it aects both the costs and the benets of solving the agency
problem in any given way. The way the agency problem is solved then maps back
into competition. We still have a very limited understanding of these interactions
and general equilibrium eects, and more research is needed.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. In case a, transform (2) as follows. Assume that pn2 = 1, solve
for p1 and nd that
v2+p1
2
is indeed larger than one. Then, assume that pn2 =
v2+p1
2
and nd p1 = s
A. This gives the following:
Case 1. if v1+(2 )v2
4   1 :
p1 = max

v1 v2+
2
; sB
	
; pn2 = 1;
Case 2. if v1+(2 )v2
4  < 1 :
p1 =
v1  2v2
2  
2
; pn2 =
v1+(2 )v2
4  ; if s
B  v1  2v2
2  
2
p1 = s
B; pn2 =
v2+sB
2
; if sB 2
h
v1  2v2
2  
2
; 2  v2
i
p1 = s
B; pn2 = 1; if s
B  2  v2
(15)
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In case b, transforming (4) in a similar way, we obtain that pn2 = min
n
v2+sB
2
; 1
o
and
p1 = p
y
2 = s
B; if sB  v1 v2
2 
p1 =
v1 v2+sB
2
; py2 = s
B; if sB 2
h
v1 v2
2  ;
v1+(2 )v2
4 
i
p1 =
v1  2v2
2  
2
; py2 =
v1+(2 )v2
4  ; if s
B  v1+(2 )v2
4 
(16)
We are now left to determine where the change from case a to case b occurs. We
will need the following Lemma.
Lemma 9 (i) If p1 = s
B in both cases, the prots are the same. (ii) If p1 = s
B in
one of the two cases and p1 6= sB in the other, then prots are higher in the latter.
Proof. (i) True by comparing (1) and (3) (for the latter case, p1 = p
y
2 = s
B). (ii)
True since p1 = s
B is feasible in both cases.
We will say that p1 (and the corresponding case) is constrained when p1 = s
B
in this case. If only one case is constrained, the other is optimal. The change from
case a to case b occurs when either both are unconstrained, or both are constrained
(so p1 = s
B) and one case becomes unconstrained.
There are the following parameter ranges to consider.
Case 1. If v1+(2 )v2
4   1, up to sB = v1 v22  case a is unconstrained while
case b is constrained. For sB 2  v1 v2
2  ;
v1 v2+
2

both cases are unconstrained and
the cut-o BM1 is found from the equality of 
BM
a and 
BM
b , given by (1) and (3),
respectively, with the corresponding prices. For sB > BM1 , case b is optimal.
Case 2. If v1+(2 )v2
4  < 1, then
v1 v2
2  <
v1  2v2
2  
2
, and therefore, up to sB = v1 v2
2 
case a is unconstrained while case b is constrained; thus, case a is optimal. For
sB 2

v1 v2
2  ;
v1  2v2
2  
2

both cases are unconstrained and BM2 is found from the
equality of (1) and (3) with the corresponding prices. For sB > BM2 , case b is
optimal.
Proposition 1 In the benchmark setting, there are only two equilibria and they are
asymmetric:
1. If v1+(2 )v2
4   1, in one rm the cut-o is v1 v2+2 and in the other it is
(2+)v1 v2(2+)+2
4
.
2. If v1+(2 )v2
4  < 1, in one rm the cut-o is
v1  2v2
2  
2
and in the other it is
(2+ 2)v1 2v2
4  .
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Proof. Plug optimal second-period prices from (2) and (4) into (1) and (3), respec-
tively. The prot function BM
BM =

BMa ; if s
A  sB
BMb ; if s
A  sB;
(where BMa and 
BM
b are given by (1) and (3), respectively) is a function of
 
sA; sB

only. Let us nd the equilibria by construction.33 Since symmetric pure-strategy
equilibria do not exist (Corollary 1), we look for asymmetric ones. Then, one rm
(say, A) will be in case b while the other rm, rm B, will be in case a.
Case 1: v1+(2 )v2
4   1: If the rm A is in case b, then its cut-o equals sA =
v1 v2+
2
(see Lemma 1). Then, the reaction of rm B is sB = v1 v2+s
A
2
since
sA > BM1 , that is,
sB =
(2 + ) v1   v2 (2 + ) + 2
4
:
For
 
sA; sB

to be an equilibrium, rm A must prefer to be indeed in case
b, when rm B has cut-o sB. This is equivalent to sB being below BM1 . The
necessary and sucient condition for this is that, at sB = sB, prots BMa are
higher than prots BMb .
Let us rst nd the optimal prices and then compare prots. Note that the
following inequalities hold:
v1   v2
2    s
B  v1   v2 + 
2
 v1 + (2  ) v2
4   .
Then, in the case where p1  sB, p1 = v1 v2+2 and pn2 = 1 (see (15)). If
p1  sB, then p1 = v1 v2+sB2 , py2 = sB and pn2 = min
n
v2+sB
2
; 1
o
(see (16)). At
sB = sB, min
n
v2+sB
2
; 1
o
= 1. Once these prices are plugged into BMa and 
BM
b ,
the dierence in prots is positive:
BMa jsB=sB  BMb jsB=sB=
1
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2(4  2)(v1   v2 +    2)2 > 0:
Case 2: v1+(2 )v2
4  < 1: If the rm A is in case b, then its cut-o equals s
A =
v1  2v2
2  
2
(see Lemma 1). Then, the reaction of rm B is sB = v1 v2+s
A
2
since
sA 2

BM2 ;
v1+(2 )v2
4 

, that is,
sB =
 
2 + 
2

v1   2v2
4   :
33Note that while BM is continuous in both arguments, it may not be quasiconcave in sA(it may
be M-shaped). Then, the standard theorem for the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
(Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) due to Debreu (1952)) cannot be applied.
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For
 
sA; sB

to be an equilibrium, rm A must prefer to be indeed in case
b, when rm B has cut-o sB. This is equivalent to sB being below BM2 . The
necessary and sucient condition for this is that, at sB = sB, prots BMa are
higher than prots BMb .
Let us rst nd the optimal prices and then compare prots. Note that the
following inequalities hold:
v1   v2
2    s
B  v1  

2
v2
2  
2
 v1 + (2  ) v2
4   .
Then, in the case where sA  sB, p1 = v1 

2
v2
2  
2
and pn2 =
v1+(2 )v2
4  (see (15)). If
sA  sB, then p1 = v1 v2+sB2 , py2 = sB and pn2 = min
n
v2+sB
2
; 1
o
(see (16)). At
sB = sB, min
n
v2+sB
2
; 1
o
= v2+s
B
2
. Once these prices are plugged into (1) and (3),
the dierence in prots is positive:
BMa jsB=sB  BMb jsB=sB=
1
16
2(4     2)(v2   1)2  0:
Proof of Lemma 3. Using Lemma 2, (6) becomes
max
p12[sB ;1]
FCa = (v1   p1) p1
and the optimal price is p1 = max

v1
2
; sB
	
. (8) becomes
max
p1sBpn21
FCb = (v1   p1) p1 +  (v2   pn2 )
 
pn2   sB

and the optimal prices are p1 = s
A = min

v1
2
; sB
	
and pn2 = min
n
v2+sB
2
; 1
o
.
Finally, FCa < 
FC
b for s
B  v1
2
, therefore, FC < v1
2
and is found from the
equality of prots in the two cases with the corresponding prices inserted.
Lemma 10 In the benchmark setting, under inter-period competition from past sales,
0. If v1+(2 )v2
2pv2+2   1, s
A is
sA =
2666664
v1 v2+
2
; if sB  v1 v2+
2
sB; if sB 2
h
v1 v2+
2
;
v1 pv2
2 
i
v1 pv2+sB
2
; if sB 2
h
v1 pv2
2  ;min
n
v1+(2 )pv2
4  ; 1
oi
v1  2pv2
2  
2
; if sB  v1+(2 )pv2
4  (if
v1+(2 )pv2
4  < 1)
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1. If v1+(2 )v2
2pv2+2  < 1 
v1+(2 )v2
4  , there exists 
BM
1 2

v1 pv2
2  ;
v1 v2+
2

such that
sA is
sA =
2664
v1 v2+
2
; if sB  BM1
v1 pv2+sB
2
; if sB 2
h
BM1 ;min
n
v1+(2 )pv2
4  ; 1
oi
v1  2pv2
2  
2
; if sB  v1+(2 )pv2
4  (if
v1+(2 )pv2
4  < 1)
2. If v1+(2 )v2
4  < 1, there exists 
BM
2 2

v1 pv2
2  ;
v1  2v2
2  
2

such that sA is
sA =
26664
v1  2v2
2  
2
; if sB  BM2
v1 pv2+sB
2
; if sB 2
h
BM2 ;
v1+(2 )pv2
4 
i
v1  2pv2
2  
2
; if sB  v1+(2 )pv2
4 
Proof. Proceeds in the same way as the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 5. The proof is based on the fact that BM  FC since
the full-commitment solution is feasible in the benchmark setting. The equality is
reached if and only if all the prices and production are the same.
(i) In the benchmark setting, p1 = s
A and py2 2

sA; sB

. When the two cut-os
are the same, then p1 = p
y
2 = s
A = sB (and pn2 is ex post optimal). In the full-
commitment setting, p1 = p
y
2 = s
A (Lemma 2). When the two cut-os are the same,
then p1 = p
y
2 = s
A = sB (and pn2 is ex post optimal). Thus, prices and production
are the same in the two settings and prots are the same as well.
(ii) Suppose sA > sB in the benchmark setting, then pn2 > s
A. In the full-
commitment setting, in order to have the same sA, principal A sets p1 = p
n
2 = s
A.
The prices are dierent in the two settings and, therefore, the full-commitment prots
are lower than the benchmark ones. If sA < sB, it is py2 which is dierent in the two
settings. If sA 6= sB in the full-commitment setting, again, either pn2 or py2 will be
equal to p1 while this is not the case in the benchmark setting.
Proof of Lemma 6. As before, there are two possible cases depending on whether
sA is higher or lower than sB. In each of these cases there are two subcases. We
solve each subcase, write the combined solution for each case, and then characterize
the (full) solution.
Start with case a, i.e., solving (10). There are two subcases. If sA  2  v2, then
p1 =
(2  ) sA + v2
2
pn2 =
v2 + s
A
2
:
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We can reformulate the problem (10) as the one of choosing sA
max
sA2[sB ;2 v2]
1
2
 
2v1   (2  ) sA   v2

sA +
1
2

 
v2   sA
2
:
The solution is
sA = min

max

sB;
v1   v2
2  3
2


; 2  v2

:
If sA > 2  v2,
p1 = (1  ) sA + 
pn2 = 1:
(10) becomes
max
sA2[maxf2 v2;sBg;1]
 
v1   (1  ) sA   

sA +  (v2   1)
 
1  sA
and the solution is
sA = min

max

sB;
v1   v2
2 (1  ) ; 2  v2

; 1

:
Combining the two subcases, the optimal sA is
sA =
26664
min
n
max
n
v1 v2
2(1 ) ; s
B
o
; 1
o
; if 2  v2  v1 v22  3
2

min
n
max
n
v1 v2
2(1 ) or
v1 v2
2  3
2

; sB
o
; 1
o
; if 2  v2 2
h
v1 v2
2  3
2

; v1 v2
2(1 )
i
min
n
max
n
v1 v2
2  3
2

; sB
o
; 1
o
; if 2  v2  v1 v22(1 )
However, the intermediate case 2   v2 2

v1 v2
2  3
2

; v1 v2
2(1 )

is not a separate case.
There is ev2 2 v1 v22  3
2

; v1 v2
2(1 )

such that
sA =
24 minnmaxnv1 v22(1 ) ; sBo ; 1o ; if 2  v2  ev2
min
n
max
n
v1 v2
2  3
2

; sB
o
; 1
o
; if 2  v2  ev2 (17)
Consider now case b, that is, solve (11). The second-period price when the other
rm did not produce in period 1; pn2 ; is
pn2 = min

v2 + s
B
2
; 1

:
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To nd sA, consider again two subcases. If sA  2sB   v2, the prices are
p1 =
(2  ) sA + v2
2
py2 =
v2 + s
A
2
:
The maximization problem (11) becomes (omit the last part that depends only
on pn2 )
max
sA2sB v2
1
2
 
2v1   (2  ) sA   v2

sA +
1
2

 
v2   sA
2
(18)
and the solution is
sA = min

v1   v2
2  3
2

; 2sB   v2

:
If sA  2sB   v2, the prices are
p1 = (1  ) sA + sB
py2 = s
B:
The maximization problem (11) becomes (omit the last part that depends only
on pn2 )
max
sA2[2sB v2;sB ]
 
v1   (1  ) sA   sB

sA + 
 
v2   sB
  
sB   sA (19)
and the solution is
sA = max

min

sB;
v1   v2
2 (1  )

; 2sB   v2

:
Combining the two subcases, there is NC2 such that the optimal s
A is
sA =
2664
sB; if sB  min
n
v1 v2
2(1 ) ; 
NC
2
o
v1 v2
2(1 ) ; if s
B 2
h
v1 v2
2(1 ) ; 
NC
2
i
(when this region exists)
v1 v2
2  3
2

; if sB  NC2
The cut-o NC2 is found from the equality of (18) and (19) with the corresponding
prices. If this equation does not have solutions, dene NC2 as being equal to one.
Note that sA jumps down at NC2 .
Before we combine this case with the previous one, let us show that NC2 >
v1
2
. To do this, we need that for sB  v1
2
, prots (18) are smaller than prots
(19). Consider (19). Since v1 v2
2(1 )  v12 , sA = max
n
min
n
sB; v1 v2
2(1 )
o
; 2sB   v2
o
=
max

sB; 2sB   v2
	
= sB. Therefore, sA = p1 = p
y
2 = s
B. By Lemma 3 (and its
proof), this is also the full-commitment solution for p1  sB. Then, prots (19)
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cannot be lower than prots (18) and are actually strictly higher since, in the latter
case, sA = min
n
v1 v2
2  3
2

; 2sB   v2
o
< sB.
Finally, we need to nd out at which sB the change from case a to case b occurs.
Denote it NC1 . For s
B  v1
2
, if sA  sB, the no-commitment solution (17) is
dierent from the full-commitment solution (see Lemma 3 and its proof). Therefore,
NCa < 
FC
a . If s
A  sB, then the full and no-commitment solutions coincide (see
the paragraph above), and therefore, NCb = 
FC
b . But then 
NC
1 has to be smaller
than its full-commitment counterpart, FC . Note that
NC1 < 
FC <
v1
2
< NC2 :
Proof of Lemma 8. The principal A's problem is8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
max
p1
NCb = (v1   p1) sA
+


 
(v2   py;c2 )
 
py;c2   sA

+ (v2   pn;c2 )
 
pn;c2   sB

+(1  ) (v2   pi2)
 
pi2   sA
 
s.t. p1  sB, py;c2 = min
n
v2+sA
2
; sB
o
; pi2 = min
n
v2+sB
2
; 1
o
;
pi2 = min
n
v2+sA
2
; 1
o
; (13)
Replace p1 = s
A (1  ) +  [py;c2 + (1  )] so that the problem amounts to the
choice of sA. We need to show that
@2NCb
@@sA
 0. Dierentiate NCb with respect to 
@NCb
@
1

= (v2   pn;c2 )
 
pn;c2   sB

+
 
pi2   py;c2
  
pi2 + p
y;c
2   v2

:
Then,
@2NCb
@@sA
1

=
24 0; if py;c2 = pi2 = v2+sA2sA
2
if py;c2 = s
B; pi2 =
v2+sA
2
0; if py;c2 = s
B; pi2 = 1
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